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ABSTRACT 
The parallel between contemporary issues and Roman history often
fascinates and illuminates. In this Article, I argue how Roman law can serve
today as an inspiration toward global constitutionalism given it was one 
of the several sources of inspiration for the American founders. Looking 
* © 2019 Rafael Domingo.  Spruill Family Research Professor at Emory University
and ICS Professor of Law at the University of Navarra.
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to Roman law helps reduce certain prejudices derived from the current
privileging of the sovereign state and the positivist paradigm as the only 
genuine and possible models for international law. These prejudices constitute 
an actual hindrance to the right development of global constitutionalism.
Global constitutionalism inherently moves beyond sovereignty, nationalism, 
and positivism. Roman law enables constitutionalists to eliminate from 
global constitutionalism any nonfoundational elements derived from a highly 
statist paradigm, mostly due to its precedence to the notions of sovereignty, 
nationalism, and positivism. Roman law also constitutes a good antidote 
to any kind of extreme global constitutionalism that seeks to extend the
language and modes of national constitutionalism without sufficiently 
filtering and refining them. 
I. INTRODUCTION
This article tries to contribute to the gripping academic debate on global 
constitutionalism1 by drawing on ideas and arguments from Roman law.
This approach entails neither nostalgia nor anachronism. Just as Roman 
constitutional principles and values illuminated the decision of the framers of 
the United States Constitution in 1787,2 Roman constitutional history can 
also have a practical impact on the global constitutionalist experience.3 
This can occur especially if we consider the word “constitution” (from Latin
constituere: to set up, to establish) in the broader and traditional sense—
i.e., linked to concepts of community, checks and balances, and participation 
—rather than in the narrow modern sense of the liberal, democratic, formal 
1. Global constitutionalism is an umbrella expression used to capture the need for
applied constitutional principles, values, standards, procedures, and mechanisms beyond
the state. The term denotes a way of thinking about global governance that promotes a deeper
understanding of the foundations of international law and the global legal order applying
the language of constitutional law. In fact, international law is moving, at least in some
areas, from a paradigm based on state sovereignty and consensualism to a new one based on
progressive constitutionalization; see Anne Peters, Global Constitutionalism, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (2014), for a general overview of the current debate
on global constitutionalism as well as for selected bibliography on this topic; see also generally
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF & JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2009); JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010); SURENDRA BHANDARI, GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE PATH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016); ANTHONY F. LANG 
JR. & ANTJE WIENER, HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2017); TAKAO SUAMI 
ET AL., GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM EUROPEAN AND EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES (2018).
2. See  DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 58–59 (2008).
3. See HAROLD JAMES, THE ROMAN PREDICAMENT: HOW THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL
ORDER CREATE THE POLITICS OF EMPIRE 141 (2006) (Adam Smith and Edward Gibbon also 
used the Roman example to illustrate the relations between Britain and its North American 
colonies).
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constitutions associated with sovereign nations. While the Americans can 
rightly say, “We the People of the United States,” the Romans many
centuries earlier were able to declare “We the People of Rome.” It seems 
that Roman public law can serve as a model for global constitutionalists 
interested in developing principles, rules, mechanisms, and standards to
order the emerging global human community, as well as its correlative 
incipient legal order. A so-called global law.4 
Because it predates the nation-state, Roman law constitutes a good antidote
against any kind of extreme constitutionalism that would seek to extend 
unfiltered or unrefined language and modes of national constitutionalism.
But Roman law also constitutes a good antidote against those who are
skeptical about the viability of global constitutionalism. Looking to Roman
law tempers the view that the current constitutional positivist sovereign
state is the only genuine and possible paradigm. This prejudice, seems to
constitute an actual hindrance to the right development of global
constitutionalism, which is genetically postsovereigntist, postnationalist, 
and postpositivist. If global constitutionalism is post all of these things, 
Roman law was, so to speak, pre all of them: presovereigntist, prenationalist,
and prepositivist. Global constitutionalism and Roman law are thus linked 
in being nonsovereigntist, nonnationalist, and nonpositivist. They represent 
the past and the future of the law, though not the present, which is mostly
sovereigntist, nationalist, and positivist. 
The Roman law paradigm does not constitute a perfect framework for 
global constitutionalism, since global constitutionalism cannot turn back
the clock to become presovereigntist, prenationalist, and prepositivist, as 
Roman law was. Moreover, the Romans did not share certain fundamental 
values of global constitutionalism, such as the concept of radical human equality
under law, principles of liberal democracy, the principle of nondiscrimination, 
or the moral duty to avoid war, among others.5 Nevertheless, some aspects 
of Roman law can provide inspiration to cosmopolitan constitutionalists.
Put differently, what Roman law offers to global constitutionalism is not
an imitable model but genius, vision, ideas, and stimulus. 
4. See generally  NEIL WALKER, INTIMATIONS OF GLOBAL LAW (2015); RAFAEL
DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW (2010).
5. See generally  THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ROMAN LAW (David Johnston
ed., 2015) (providing a general overview of Roman law); PAUL DE PLESSIS ET AL., THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW AND SOCIETY (2010); RAFAEL DOMINGO, ROMAN 
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (2018); see also  FRANZ WIEACKER, RÖMISCHE RECHTGESCHICHTE:
QUELLENKUNDE, RECHTSBILDUNG, JURISPRUDENZ AND RECHTSLITERATUR I (1988). 
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I offer three caveats before developing my argument. First, my effort 
is not undermined by the fact that Roman law was instrumental in the
maturation and progress of the classical doctrine of international law, which 
the new constitutionalism seeks to overcome. This historical tension is 
merely a consequence of the polyvalent capacity of Roman law to illuminate 
even opposite undertakings.6 On the other hand, classical international law
was founded not only on the Roman idea of the law of nations (ius gentium);7 
but also, and specifically, on the Roman law of contracts and property. 
The laws governing international treaties owe much to Roman law of contracts. 
The same can be said of the Roman law of property in relation to the doctrine
of sovereign territory.8 Global constitutionalism, however, could benefit 
from other ideas and values of the constitution of the Roman Republic that
are at the heart of Roman public law. 
My second caveat is that, while Roman law supported an empire and 
therefore, an imperialist perspective, this fact does not reduce the potential
advantages of Roman law’s inspiration. On the contrary, the transition from 
the Roman Republic to the Roman Empire during the Principate (27 BCE 
to 284 CE), inaugurated by Emperor Augustus (63 BCE – 14 CE), implied
a break with the Republican constitutional order and principles that support 
my argument. The Roman revolution initiated by Augustus9 revealed the 
false universalism of an empire, just as any constitutional attempt to transform 
the world into a global state will unveil the false universalism of a spurious 
global constitutionalism. Here, too, Roman history is a heuristic key to life.
My third caveat is simply a reminder that the global human community 
is universal because it includes humankind as a totality and in its totality. 
Thus, the global community merits a unique framework: a tailor-made model 
of law. Therefore, the language of Roman law, which governed a non-universal 
and instrumental political community, should be transposed very carefully
6. See generally Max Radin, Fundamental Concepts of the Roman Law, 12 CAL.
L. REV. 393, 394 (1924) (contending that maxims of legal principles are contradictory and
cannot be used to distinguish Roman law from Common law). 
7. See Arthur Nussbaum, The Significance of Roman Law in the History of International
Law, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 681–82 (1952). 
8. See  THE ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: ALBERICO GENTILI 
AND THE JUSTICE OF EMPIRE 1 (Benedict Kingsbury & Benjamin Straumann eds., 2010)
(explaining the relationship between Roman law and international law); BENJAMIN STRAUMANN,
ROMAN LAW IN THE STATE OF NATURE: THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUGO GROTIUS’
NATURAL LAW (2015); see also Randall Lesaffer, Argument from Roman Law in Current
International Law: Occupation and Acquisitive Prescription, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 25, 25– 
28 (2005) (generally discussing the relationship between Roman law and international 
law).
9. See  BENJAMIN STRAUMANN, CRISIS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: ROMAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT FROM THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC TO THE AGE OF REVOLUTION (2016); see also
RONALD SYME, THE ROMAN REVOLUTION 1 (2002). 
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and in a limited way to the contemporary global community. This is
intrinsically universal and necessary.10 
II. APPLYING SOME LESSONS FROM ROMAN LAW TO GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
In this section, I will describe ten good examples that Roman law provides
to global constitutionalism. First, I will explain the relevant Roman principle,
value, or social fact. Then, I will refer to its potential translation into the
realm of global constitutionalism. I will accommodate my explanations of
Roman law to the purpose of this article, which is especially addressed to
constitutionalists. 
A. A Cosmopolitan Spirit 
Roman law offers global constitutionalism a good example of supporting
cosmopolitanism as a political ideal and a noble human attitude.11 The
Stoic spirit, which animated almost all the Roman jurists and many of the
Roman thinkers during both the republic and the empire (Cicero, Seneca, 
Marcus Aurelius), was cosmopolitan in character and constituted the main
influence on Roman legal education.12 Cicero applied Stoic ideas to 
international relations by making relevant statements on the duties of 
communities and peoples toward one another.13 Cicero then coined the
expression ius gentium (law of nations) in the process.14 According to Cicero,
the human race is naturally and harmonically united in a way similar to
the way parts of the body relate to each other.15 This is why “nature does not
allow us to increase our means, our resources, and our wealth by despoiling 
10. See Rafael Domingo, The New Global Human Community, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 563,
563–87 (2012), for an explanation of the differences between a global human community as a
totality and in its totality.
11. See Thomas L. Pangle, Roman Cosmopolitanism: The Stoics and Cicero, in 
COSMOPOLITANISM IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: CITIZENS WITHOUT STATES 40–69 (Lee 
Trepanier & Khalil M. Habib eds., 2011); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Kant and Stoic 
Cosmopolitanism, 5 J. POL. PHIL. 1, 1–25 (1997). 
12. See Anthony Padgen, Stoicism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Legacy of European
Imperialism, 7 CONSTELLATIONS 1, 4–20 (2000). 
13. Thomas L. Pangle, Socratic Cosmopolitanism: Cicero’s Critique and Transformation 
of the Stoic Ideal, 31 CAN. J. OF POL. SCI. 235, 251–53 (1998). 
14. See CICERO, CICERO: ON DUTIES xxvii–xviii (M.T. Griffin & E.M. Atkins eds., 
1991) (2013).
15. Id. at 108, ¶ 3.22. 
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others.”16 The same principle, according to Cicero, is established “not only
in nature, that is in the law of nations, but also in the laws of individual peoples, 
through which the political community of individual cities is maintained: 
one is not allowed to harm another for the sake of one’s own advantage.”17 
Among the late classical Roman jurists, Ulpian was the most cosmopolitan. 
His philosophical views, deeply influenced by Stoicism, were egalitarian, 
and they helped resolve the new legal challenges arising from the extension
of citizenship to all free individuals of the empire by the Antonine 
constitution (212 CE).18 Ulpian tried to convert Roman law into a more 
cosmopolitan legal system suitable to the needs of a multicultural society
based on the values of liberty, dignity, universality, and equality.19 As a result, 
scholars like Tony Honoré consider Ulpian a pioneer of the human rights 
movement.20 
Global constitutionalism is foundationally cosmopolitan.21 What in ancient 
Rome was an ideal and aspiration shared by philosophers and lawyers is
today a verifiable reality: all human beings are in fact members of an
emerging global human community in which they share needs, interests,
and projects.22 Global constitutionalism claims that this universal community 
must also be ruled by law, and that each nation state should be cosmopolitan in
spirit in the sense that it should preserve, assist, and sustain the global
legal order.23 Roman law offers strong arguments for the legitimation and
justification of these two claims.24 It also opens the door to the so-called 
postnationalist approach, which insists on reformulating the idea of the 
nation-state in the face of globalization and reterritorialization.25 
16. Id.
 17. Id. at 108, ¶ 3.23. 
18. TONY HONORÉ, ULPIAN: PIONEER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 76 (2d ed. 2002). 
19. Id. at 95. 
20. Id. at ix.
 21. See Pauline Kleingeld & Eric Brown, Cosmopolitanism, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014); see also Robert Post,
Introduction, in ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 1 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 2006) (analyzing the 
relationship between the concepts of cosmopolitanism and global constitutionalism). 
22. See Domingo, The New Global Human Community, supra note 10, at 567. 
23. See generally Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An 
Integrated Conception of Public Law, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 605 (2013) (providing
analysis on cosmopolitanism in the global legal system).
24. See Rafael Domingo, Gaius, Vattel, and the New Global Law Paradigm, 22 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 627, 630–31 (2011); see also Domingo, The New Global Human Community, 
supra note 10. 
25. In recent decades, the breakup of the former Soviet Union and increased immigration, 
among other factors, has caused a rise in nationalism, while the idea of the nation-state 
continues to deteriorate; see, e.g., Robert Conquest et al., Soviet Union, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Soviet-Union [https://perma.cc/W6QV-
8BEZ] (last modified Dec. 20, 2018). 
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B. Unwritten Constitution 
The language of constitutionalism in relation to the global community
benefits from the Roman law experience, which established a model of
community without a codified constitution.26 
Rome never had a written constitution.27 Rather than a single document, 
Rome’s constitution was a living and nimble set of legal and political
norms.28 It was a long, ongoing, and complex process of constituting the
Republic by creating and developing institutions, political powers, principles 
and rules, practices and functions, as well as mutual institutional relations.29 
The Roman constitution was largely unwritten and evolving over time,
and it was based on tradition but not on obsolete precedents.30 The Roman 
constitution contained fundamental elements, such as the annual election
of two consuls, the existence and functions of the Senate, and the gathering 
of different popular assemblies for different purposes.31 However, these 
elements were unregulated by written statutes.32 The Roman constitution 
accommodated changing circumstances with new ideas and arguments.33 
For this reason, the Roman constitution was inescapably controversial, 
intrinsically political, and always opens to testing in public debate.34 
Romans were proud of the superiority of their constitution because of its 
stability, balanced structure, clear assignment of functions, and solid
discipline.35 The great Greek historian Polybius (c 200–118 BCE) associated
Roman military success with the perfection and greatness of Rome’s
constitution,36 which enabled Rome to bring almost the whole of the
Mediterranean world under its dominion within a mere fifty-three years. 
26. KARL LOEWENSTEIN, THE GOVERNANCE OF ROME 179–80, 227 (1973). 
 27. Clinton Walker Keyes, Original Elements in Cicero’s Ideal Constitution, 42 AM. J.
OF PHILOLOGY 309 (1921). 
28. See WOLFGANG KUNKEL,AN INTRODUCTION TOROMAN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY (J. M. Kelly trans., 2d ed. 1973), for an overview of the Roman constitution;
ANDREW LINTOTT, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC (1999); STRAUMANN, 
CRISIS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 9. 
29. DOMINGO, ROMAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 5, at 29. 
30. Domingo, Gaius, Vattel, and the New Global Paradigm, supra note 24. 
31. DOMINGO, ROMAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 5, at 29. 
32. Domingo, Gaius, Vattel, and the New Global Law Paradigm, supra note 24. 
33. Id. 
34. DOMINGO, ROMAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 5, at 29. 
35. See CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAWS 3 (James E. G. Zetzel 
ed., 1999).
36. 1 POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES 9 (W. R. Paton trans., 1999). 
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Polybius and Cicero understood the Republican constitution as a mixed
constitution.37 This understanding arose from the combined elements of
aristocracy (the Senate) with democracy (the people) and monarchy (the 
consuls).38 According to Cicero, such a constitution has an extensive component 
of equality; it provides harmony and stability, and it prevents corruption.39 
Simple constitutions lead to corrupted versions of each kind of rule, producing 
a despot rather than a king, an oligarchy as opposed to an aristocracy, and 
a chaotic mob instead of a democracy.40 In contrast, the Roman constitution 
provided a system of checks and balances based on a combination of powers
and vetoes of magistrates, and political control of the magistrates by the
Senate and the people.41 The greatness of the Roman constitution can be
reflected in a short phrase: “the Senate and the People of Rome” (Senatus 
Populusque Romanus, abbreviated as SPQR).42 As Cicero explained through 
Cato the Elder, one of the reasons the Roman constitution was superior to others 
was that it was established not by the great ability of a single man but by
the leadership of many, and not in the course of one life but over eras and
generations.43 
The constitutional experience of Rome helps international constitutionalists 
replace the state paradigm by a global paradigm. The global community
does not need a written, comprehensive, and totalizing constitution, as if 
it would be the supreme law of a world state. The global paradigm does 
not need to resemble the constitutional features of a nation-state. Any attempt 
to establish a comprehensive constitution will fail both at the national and 
the global level. Rather, the global community needs to be organized under a
coherent global legal order that ensures global harmony, stability, and
development and limits the use of power. Such a legal order demands, of 
course, some degree of constitutionalization, but not a comprehensive written 
constitution. 
37. Compare 3 POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES 11–18 (W. R. Paton trans., 2010) (explaining
that Polybius does not use the expression “mixed constitution” as such), with CICERO,
supra note 35, ¶ 1.69 (describing that for Cicero, the mixed constitution was primarily an 
instrument for restoring the lost constitutional balance, a last resort to save the republic, but his
preferred constitutional order was not mixed); see also JED W. ATKINS, ROMAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 11–36 (2018); Mitja Sadek, Cicero and the Mixed Constitution (res publica
mixta), 11 KERIA: STUDIA LATINA ET GRAECA 29, 31 (2009). 
38. Elizabeth Asmis, A New Kind of Model; Cicero’s Roman Constitution in De 
Repubica, 126 AM. J. OF PHILOLOGY 377 (2005).
39. CICERO, supra note 35, ¶ 1.69. 
40. NEAL WOOD, CICERO’S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 144 (1988). 
41. HANS JULIUS WOLFF, ROMAN LAW: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 27 (1951).
42. NEAL WOOD, supra note 40, at 125. 
43. CICERO, supra note 35, ¶ 2.1.2. 
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C. Respect for Tradition 
The Romans possessed a special veneration for tradition, precedent, and 
authority.44 They esteemed ancestral customs (mores maiorum), the ways
of their forebears, and their traditional ideas, particularly in the field of 
law.45 The Romans preserved a notable spirit of traditionalism.46 They were
reluctant to abolish any valid law, because they considered their ancestors part
of the Roman people.47 Additionally, Romans had a deeply rooted distaste 
for unnecessary changes and greatly distrusted novelty.48 They did not like
quick innovations, hurried modifications, and revolutionary attitudes. They
tried to build on what their ancestors had built, exquisitely respecting key 
legal decisions in the past. This conservative attitude explains the centuries-
long preservation of the rigid and severe formalism that characterizes the 
primitive legal system.49 At the heart of the Romans’ conservatism and respect 
for tradition lays the idea that justice, as a constant, continual, and perpetual
individual and collective will, required careful and gradual historical
development.50 The leader was the people as an eternal community, not 
this or that particular lawgiver. 
The evolutionary nature of Roman law constitutes a good example for 
global constitutionalism because the integrative conceptual framework of 
global constitutionalism should be evolutionary, not revolutionary. Global 
constitutionalism should respect tradition. International law is mainly a 
European tradition.51 Constitutionalism is both a European and an American
tradition. But the universality of global constitutionalism should by no means 
exclude respect for the particularity of tradition. As Martti Koskenniemi
has pointed out, “if the universal has no representative of its own, then 
particularity itself is not scandal.”52 The particularity transcends itself when
it is accepted by others as universal. For my purposes, this means that global 
constitutionalism will be universalized when it is universally accepted as 







51. See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and 
Renewal, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 113, 113–15 (2005). 
52. Id. at 115. 
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an inherent element of the global human community and an adequate politics 
of global law. 
D. Nonsovereign State Paradigm 
Roman law can help global constitutionalism to transcend the sovereignty-
based state paradigm. The sovereign nation-state is a modern abstraction 
quite contrary to the Roman spirit. Politically, the Roman people were 
invested not with sovereignty but with maiestas (majesty), one of the 
fundamental principles of the Roman Republic.53 Maiestas was an original
concept with no equivalent term in Greek.54 Maiestas comes from maior
(greater) and expresses the idea of the superiority and greatness of the
Roman people.55 In virtue of its superiority, Rome demanded respect and
submission from other peoples, although this requirement did not imply a 
rejection of others’ liberty.56 Indeed, liberty of other people was considered a
necessary condition of Roman maiestas.57 The transference of majesty from
the people to the emperor began with Augustus and ended by the beginning 
of the Dominate at the end of the third century.58 As the emperor’s majesty 
grew, the republican structure declined, but majesty remained the measure
of authority.59 
The idea of sovereignty on the other hand, represents a French absolutist
and exclusive adaptation of Roman majesty. Sovereignty appeared for the 
first time in Jean Bodin’s Les six livres de la République (1576).60 In Les
six livres de la République, Bodin understood sovereignty as, “[the] absolute 
and perpetual vested in a commonwealth,” or, in French, “la puissance absolue
et perpetuelle d’une République.”61 In the Latin version of Bodin’s work, 
53. See Bernard Kübler, Maiestas, in 14.1 PAULYS REALENCYCLOPÄDIE DER
CLASSISCHEN ALTERTUMSWISSENSCHAFT: LYSIMICHOS BIT MANTIKE 452–59 (Friederich
Pauly ed., 1928); R. A. BAUMAN, THE CRIMEN MAIESTATIS IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC AND
AUGUSTAN PRINCIPATE 1–14 (1967); RAFAEL DOMINGO, TEORIA DE LA “AUCTORITAS” 23– 
23 (1987); ÁLVARO JACOBO PÉREZ,  AUCTORITAS ET MAIESTAS. HISTORIA, PROGRAMA 
DINÁSTICO E ICONOGRAFÍA EN LA MONEDA DE VESPASIANO 55–57 (2003); Davide Salvo, 
Maiestas, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANCIENT HISTORY 4236–38 (2013). 






 60. See FRANCESCO CALASSO, I GLOSSATORI E LA TEORIA DELLA SOVRANITÀ (Giuffrè, 3d
ed. 1957), for the medieval antecedents, especially those beginning with the formula rex 
superiorem non recognocens in regno suo est imperator. 
61. See JEAN BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE 24 (M. J. Tooley trans., Basil
Blackwell Oxford 1955) (1576). Discusses the attributes of sovereignty, id. at 41–43, and a 
numerical discussion of them as the first and second attributes of sovereignty, id. at 43–45; 
226
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the definition of maiestas appears as a synonym of “sovereignty,” loosely
translated by Ulpian’s phrase, “the emperor is not bound by statutes,” or,
in Latin, “princeps legibus solutus.”62 Sovereignty was thus an exclusive 
and excluding power in the hands of the prince, who could impose laws 
upon his subjects without their consent and without himself being bound 
by them.63 Sovereignty so conceived implied an absolute indivisibility of
power within a community and an absolute independence in international
relations.64 This concept of sovereignty—which again replaced the Roman
concept of maiestas—definitively closed the doors to a harmoniously ordered
international system.65 And, instead, it artificially standardized a constellation 
of states, each with plenary powers in its respective territory enclosed by
borders. 
Of course, there is little left of this initial concept of princely sovereignty 
in current international law. But, the whole system of international law
was, in a way, vitiated by this exclusionary territorial idea of sovereignty. 
Moreover, if the very category of international law seems to appear outdated
in our globalized world, it is probably because of the restrictions imposed
by the idea of sovereignty. Sovereignty was essential to the creation of an 
international law based on coexistence, but it is a real hindrance in developing 
an international law based on cooperation and solidarity. The idea of
sovereignty must be revised for it to be compatible with the principles and
values of global constitutionalism. The options appear to be adopting a 
pluralist sovereign approach or replacing the concept of sovereignty with
a new political concept that captures the essence of the global community 
as different from the global state.66 This does not mean that sovereignty 
has no role in the new global paradigm because sovereignty could remain
as an instrumental and useful concept, but only after its reformulation.67 
It is the role of global constitutionalists to rid the idea of sovereignty of 
see DANIEL LEE, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN EARLY MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 1-
2 (2016), for discussion on the idea of sovereignty; see HOWELL A. LLOYD, JEAN BODIN
‘THIS PRE-EMINENT MAN OF FRANCE’ AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY (2017), for an
intellectual biography of Jean Bodin. 
62. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 13, ¶ 1.3.31 (Alan Watson trans., 1998). 
63. See BODIN, supra note 61, at 20–22. 
64. See Jens Bartelson, On the Indivisibility of Sovereignty: Republics of Letters: A
Journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics, and the Arts, 2 LUND U. 85, 86 (2011). 
65. DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW, supra note 4, at 65. 
66. See JEAN L. COHEN, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY: RETHINKING LEGALITY,
LEGITIMACY, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 53–56 (2012). 
67. Id.
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its dark side, which involves exclusions, boundaries, impunity, and lack
of solidarity.68 If Roman law is presovereigntist, global constitutionalism
should be definitely postsovereigntist. 
E. An Integrated Idea of Public Law 
Ulpian roughly defined public law as the law that concerned the state
of the Roman commonwealth (quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat).69 By
contrast, he defined private law as the law governing relations between
private individuals (ad singulorum utilitatem).70 In general, public law was
established for the interest of the political community or the people.71 It 
covered everything not concerned with the private interest of individual 
citizens. Public law dealt with the constitution, administration, and functioning 
of the Roman political community. It integrated and combined religion and 
administration of the political community, and it was concerned with
magistrates, priests, and sacred things. Public law basically emanated from
popular assemblies and the Senate and later from the emperor as well. 
While public law was a collective product of generations of senators and
magistrates, private law was a manifestation of the free will of the individual.72 
It was an expression of individual rights and freedoms, though it was not 
governed just by self-interest. Private law retained the idea of moral duty.73 
The most important practical difference between Roman public law and
private law was that “public law cannot be changed by agreements concluded
between private individuals.”74 This unchangeable law is exactly what we 
would now call ius cogens.75 However, at the heart of both public and private 
law lays the idea that public law could not eclipse or replace private law.
In Roman law, public law was an expansion of private law, and not vice versa, 
because the individual (i.e., the citizen), not the political community, was 
the center of the Roman legal system. Public law proceeded from private law. 
This original model of the construction of the law, from the bottom up and 
not from the top down, ought to be transferred to all legal spheres, including 
global constitutionalism, traditionally established from the top down. 
68. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI & JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (2012).
69. See THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 62, at 1, ¶ 1.1.1.2.
70. Id. 
71. Id.
 72. DOMINGO, ROMAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 5, at 9.
 73. Id.
 74. THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 62, at 71, ¶ 2.14.38. 
75. See REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (2d ed. 1994) (defining 
ius cogens under the literal meaning of “compelling law,” which is the technical term given
to those norms of general international law that are hierarchically superior).
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In Ciceronian thought, public interest (utilitas rei publicae) and stability
(salus) were the twin aims of public law.76 Public interest served as a 
principle for legitimating new statutes, a standard for legal interpretation, 
and a guide for jurisprudential activity.77 Papinian mentioned public interest
as the ultimate ground for the validity of praetorian law,78 and Ulpian did
not hesitate to put the idea of utilitas at the center of any legal change: “In
determining [new rules], there ought to be some clear advantage [(utilitas)]
in view, so as to justify departing from a rule of law which has seemed
fair since time immemorial.”79 Drawing upon Greek philosophy and the
Ciceronian understanding of utilitas, classical jurists abundantly invoked 
the idea of utilitas (in the general sense of practicality, social interest, and 
sound policy) as a good reason to explain the acceptance of a concrete and 
pragmatic legal solution instead of another solution based on strict logical 
and dogmatic reasoning.80 
Modern public law is a result of necessary secularization, rationalization, 
and positivization.81 Still, the essential Roman concept of utilitas should
continue to be vital. The theory of sovereignty held sway for centuries as
the basis of public law, but it should be replaced by the ideas of public 
service,82 solidarity, and functionality. These should be at the heart of global
constitutionalism as well.83 An excessive entanglement of sovereignty and 
76. MARCUS CICERO, ON INVENTION. THE BEST KIND OF ORATOR. TOPICS 111–13
(Taylor Anderson ed., H.M. Hubbell trans., 3d ed. 1949). 
77. DOMINGO, ROMAN LAW; AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 5, at 19. 
78. THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 62, at 2, ¶ 1.1.7.1. 
79. Id. at 15, ¶ 1.4.2
80. DOMINGO, ROMAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 5, at 20. 
81. See generally MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW 153–63 (2003);
MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 50–88 (2010) (discussing the modern 
understanding of public law). 
82. See LÉON DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE 32 (Frida Laski & Harold Laski 
trans., 1919). 
83. See Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L.
513, 513–44 (2009), and Anne Peters, Are We Moving Towards Constitutionalization of
the World Community?, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 118,
120–23 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2012), for a discussion of the paradigm shift from sovereignty to
humanity and humanity as the foundational principle of public law, claiming humanity
underlies the entire international system of the protection of human rights; see GUNTHER
 229
TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 
(Gareth Norbury trans., 2012), for a discussion of the societal constitutionalist approach; 
see also Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception
of Public Law, supra note 23, at 605–28 (arguing that all legitimate nation-states must be 






    
















   
     
  
    
    
    
     
   
public law leads to a fragmentation of public law. By contrast, a more inclusive
normative idea of public law connected with its purpose (or ultimate cause) 
constitutes a source of global integration. 
F. Recovering the Idea of Necessity as a Source of Binding Law 
For the Romans, necessity (necessitas) was a source of binding law.84 
Necessitas was the Roman goddess who personified the constraining force 
of destiny, the inevitable.85 She was identified with the Greek goddess
Ananke and was depicted as a powerful goddess who walked before Fortuna
carrying brass nails and wedges to fix fast the decrees of Fate.86 Opposed
to free will, necessity is a force or influence that compels an unwilling 
person or a group of persons to act.87 
Necessity affects the law in two different ways. First, sometimes the
plea of necessity should be taken into consideration to legally justify a
departure from ordinary law. This is indeed the practice regarding the
doctrine of necessity in international law, which is based on the rule that 
the law does not apply when necessity comes into play (cessat lex ubi 
venit necessitas).88 Second, sometimes, however, necessity creates law by 
grounding legal obligations and duties. This circumstance is reflected in 
the well-known legal French aphorism: nécessité oblige.89 Thus, necessity 
becomes an important source of law, that is to say, of binding legal 
obligation. I am using the concept of necessity in this latter way, although 
the two legal implications are interconnected. If necessity can lead to the 
cosmopolitan states in the sense of incorporating and reflecting the global legitimacy
conditions for claims to sovereignty in their own constitutions).
84. See Domingo, The New Global Human Community, supra note 10, at 575. 
85. Id.
 86. See Wagner, Necessitas, in AUSFÜHRLICHES LEXIKON DER GRIECHISCHEN UND
RÖMISCHEN MYTHOLOGIE cols. 70–72 (Wilhelm Heinrich Roscher ed., 1897); HORACE, ODES 
AND EPODES 86–87 (Niall Rudd ed., trans., 2004) (“[T]e semper anteit seava Necessitas, 
clavos trabalis et cuneos manu gestans aena, nec severus uncus abest liquidumque plumbum.” 
[Ruthless Necessity always strides in front of you, carrying beam nails and wedges in her
brazen hand, not forgetting the immovable clamp and lead for melting down.]). 
87. See Necessity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910). 
 88. See Francesco Accursio, Cessat lex ubi venit necessitas, in PRINCIPIOS DE DERECHO 
GLOBAL: 1,000 REGLAS Y AFORISMOS JURÍDICOS COMENTADOS 76 (Thomson Reuters Aranzadi 
2d ed., 2006), for a commentary on this rule and other similar rules. 
89. Nécessité oblige means that when a need exists, a concomitant legal obligation
arises; Tony Honoré, Necessité Oblige, in  MAKING LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL 129 (1987) (“[I]n the last resort necessity makes law: nécessité oblige.”);
see generally H.L.A.HART,THE CONCEPT OF LAW 82–91 (3d ed. 2012) (explaining the difference 
between obligation and duty; obligation always requires a voluntary agreement and a duty
does not because it derives from the law). 
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suspension of laws, it must also be able to suggest new laws. Otherwise,
society would dissolve into chaos. 
It is no mere coincidence that the wording of the most famous definition 
of obligation, from Justinian’s Institutes,90 includes the word “necessity.”
In this context, necessity expresses the idea that the obligation created by 
a legal bond constrains the wishes of the party. This definition of obligation
entered the Anglo-American common law tradition via the work of Henry
de Bracton’s (c. 1210–68) De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae.91 
The Roman jurist, Modestinus, in his first book of legal rules, expressed 
what I am trying to explain here: “Thus, all law has been made either by
consent, or established by necessity, or confirmed by custom.”92  Here, the
term necessity has its ordinary, nontechnical meaning—an imperative need 
or desire, a pressure of circumstances, a physical or moral compulsion, which 
excuses someone from fulfilling an obligation or creates a new one.93 
In our day, a strong sense of contractualism has fueled disregard for the 
partition of sources of law into consent, custom, and necessity. Consent has
become primary, while custom and necessity are relegated to irrelevance.
Custom, however, has succeeded in maintaining its (admittedly secondary) 
status in the international realm thanks to the very nature of international 
law.94 And in part, thanks to the defense of customary international law 
by some international scholars in recent years.95 But global constitutionalism
still needs to recover the concept of necessity to develop a correct approach 
to the law in this era of globalization. As Tony Honoré aptly puts it: “As 
90. JUSTINIAN, JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 104 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod eds.,
1987) (“obligatio est iuris vinculum, quo necessitate adstringimur alicuius solvendae rei 
secundum nostrae civitatis iura” [An obligation is a legal binding whereby we are bound
by a necessity of performing some act according to the laws of our community]). 
91. 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE [ON THE
LAW AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND] 283 (George E. Woodbine et al. eds., Samuel E. Thorne 
trans., 1968) (“An obligation is a legal bond whereby we are constrained, whether we wish 
to be or not, to give or do something.”). 
92. THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 62, at 14, ¶ 1.3.40. 
93. See Theo Mayer-Maly, Topik der Necessitas, in  ÉTUDES OFFERTES À JEAN 
MACQUERON 478–86 (1970).
94.  Indeed, in cases in which it is difficult to achieve an agreement between states, 
custom could play an important role; see ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 166 (2d 
ed. 2005), for further discussion and other areas in which customary law is developed. 
95. See BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 47 (2010); DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW
135 (2010).
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regards the world community necessity is the relevant ground.”96 The reason 
for grounding the world community in necessity was explained already in 
the sixteenth century by Francisco de Vitoria using Aristotelian thought:
necessary causes are final causes.97 Indeed, human relationships in an era 
of globalization have made it necessary for humanity to manage its global 
needs well. Some of those needs derive directly from human dignity (e.g.,
eradicating poverty and combating international terrorism). Global
constitutionalism provokes the pressing question of the legitimacy of
global governance,98 and the principle of necessity offers a good response.
The special norms of ius cogens and erga omnes, which have acquired
more practical relevance today, constitute a powerful expression of the 
current recovery of the principle of necessity.99 The peremptory character
of the ius cogens and the existence of norms that all states can invoke in
case of violation (erga omnes) may suggest the necessity of standards in
order for the system of international law to survive. Indeed, the international
legal order could not be a universal system if it were founded only on the 
principle of consent. If a particular political community did not consent to
the universal system of rules, international law would cease to be universal.
It is precisely the principle of necessity that makes international law universal 
(global law) by protecting some irrevocable moral values (ius cogens) and
expanding their scope (erga omnes norms).
G. A Nonfoundational Approach to Constituent Power 
Roman law helps clarify that what is foundational to global constitutionalism
is the political community of free citizens,100 rather than the constituent
power or constitution as such.101 The Senate and the People of Rome (Senatus
96. Honoré, supra note 89, at 237. 
97. See FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS 4–11 (Anthony Pagden & 
Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991). 
98. KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 1, at 351 (2009). 
99. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (7th ed., 2014) (discussing ius 
cogens and erga omnes as concepts based upon an acceptance of fundamental and superior
values within the system and in some respects akin to the notion of public order or public 
policy in domestic legal orders); see also ROBERT KOLB,THÉORIE DU IUS COGENS INTERNATIONAL:
ESSAI DE RELECTURE DU CONCEPT 5, 23–27 (2003) (explaining the unitary concepts surrounding
ius cogens and its role with necessity in the reorganization of international law for a greater
focus on the common interests and public order).
100. See Mattias Kumm, Constituent Power, Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, and 
Post-Positivist Law, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 697, 709–10 (2016). 
101. See generally LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW, supra note 81, at 221– 
28; Martin Loughlin, The Concept of Constituent Power, 13 EUR. J. OF POL. THEORY 218,
218–37 (2014); ERNST-WOLFGANG BÖCKENFÖRDE ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY: SELECTED WRITINGS 175–80 (Mirjam Künkler & Tine Stein eds., Thomas Dunlap 
trans., 2017). 
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Populusque Romanus), which embodied the political power of the Roman
Republic, presupposed the very idea of people.102 It was the people (the
citizens of the past and the present) that ultimately provided legitimacy to 
the Roman constitution, not the other way around.
The idea of constituent power, however, is modern at least in the form 
in which it emerged with the creation of the nation-state. Constituent power 
was associated with constitutionalism through the Calvinist interpretation 
of sovereign power and was transformed during the European Enlightenment 
as a result of secular rationalization.103 The concept of constituent power 
presupposes not only the belief that political power vests ultimately in the 
people or political community but also the understanding that the political 
constitution derives its power and legitimacy from the people.104 The political
community thus becomes the ultimate source of the constituent power that
legitimates the authority of constitutions. 
However, at the global legal dimension, the concept of constituent power 
should be reformulated. Otherwise, the global community would be at risk 
of being transformed into a global state. This transformation into a global 
state would be, in the words of Hannah Arendt, “the end of all political
life as we know it,”105 the end of liberty itself. The global community is a
community of many peoples and, as such, does not constitute a single people. 
A people is a plurality of persons recognized as a whole. The global
community, however, does not comprise merely a plurality of the world’s 
population but is its totality. The idea of a people demands otherness—
this people as over or against some other people. Because the global community
is unique in its totality, it is incompatible with otherness. Thus, the global
community does not require a constituent power in the modern sense of the 
expression “We the People of [some state or territory].” There is no “We
the Humanity,” and thus there can be no written formal constitution either.
In his revised account of constituent power under the perspective of 
global constitutionalism, Mattias Kumm argues that constituent power is
vested not only in “[w]e the People” but also in “the international community” 
as a requirement of a cosmopolitan and postpositivist conception of 
102. 3 CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL WRITINGS 246 (David Ames 
Curtis ed. & trans., 1993) (explaining that Senatus Populusque Romanus centers around the 
concept that sovereignty belongs to the people and that power emanates from the people). 
103. Loughlin, The Concept of Constituent Power, supra note 101, at 219. 
104. Id.
 105. HANNAH ARENDT, MEN IN DARK TIMES 81 (1995). 
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constitutionalism.106 The two components, “[w]e the People” and the 
“international community,” would be “co-constitutive” of both national
constitutions and the international community.107 This co-principle of
constituent power assures the integration of national constitutions into the 
global order. Kumm thus challenges the positivistic approach that traditionally
attributed to the constituent power a foundational role, and he defends 
instead a normatively constituted and circumscribed approach.108 
I basically agree with Kumm, but I differ in the formulation of the argument. 
In my opinion, because of globalization and the emergence (by necessity)
of a global community, the constituent power of a political community is
no longer vested in “We the People,” but in “We a people of the global 
community.” A people is no longer an independent political community
but one interdependent with the rest of the world’s population. A political 
community is thus always an expression and a part of the global community. 
The global community does not require an autonomous global constituent 
power, because it is not a complete community.109 Ultimately, the reason 
why both the political community and the global community are the constituent
power of any particular community, while at the same time there is no global
constituent power, is that the global community consists of an incomplete
but necessary community. I call complete those communities that, informed 
by the principle of autonomy and self-government, endeavor to satisfy as many
human needs as possible within their borders (work, health, education, security, 
and so on). By contrast, incomplete societies are those that strive to satisfy
only certain specific human needs. Aristotle and Aquinas considered the 
polis110 or civitas111 as the only complete and self-sufficient community. 
In our day, the nation-state is the paradigm of a complete community. In
addition to being complete in this sense, the nation-state is also an instrumental
society: it is not necessary inasmuch as its purpose is not natural and its
106. Kumm, Constituent Power, Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, and Post-Positivist 
Law, supra note 100, at 698; see also Neil Walker, The Return of Constituent Power: A Reply 
to Mattias Kumm, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 906, 907 (2016); Mattias Kumm, Constituent Power,
Boundaries and Identity: On the Justificatory Depth of Constitutionalism - A Rejoinder to
Neil Walker, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 914, 916 (2016). 
107. Kumm, Constituent Power, Boundaries and Identity, supra note 106, at 914. 
108. Id. at 920–24. 
109. See Domingo, The New Global Human Community, supra note 10, at 583, for a
discussion of the global community as an incomplete community. 
110. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. I, at 3–4 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev.
ed. 1998) (1932). 
111. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, in THE TREATISE ON LAW 127–38, pt. I-
II, Q. 90, Reply Obj. 3 (R. J. Henle, ed. & trans., 1993) (2012); see also id. at pt. II-II, Q. 
65, art. 2, Reply Obj. 2; see JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY
52, 114, 122, 219, 211 n.10, 226, 307 (1998), for additional discussion of “communitas 
perfecta” by Thomas Aquinas. 
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responsibilities can be carried out by other intermediate political and 
social groupings.112 In the same manner that Belgium, Japan, or the United 
States began to exist in a concrete historical moment, they can also cease
to exist.113 These communities are not an irreplaceable requisite for human 
existence.114 They are a cultural product of human experience and historical
development.115 The rich variety of existing political communities is mutable,
insofar as they are subject to political vicissitudes.116 In these political
communities, the science of the possible reigns; that is, these entities do 
not have an intrinsic value so much as an instrumental one.117 They are 
not ends in themselves since they are instrumental and political by nature.
The global community now has become a necessary but not sufficient
condition for any constituent power of any people who are a subset of humanity
organized as a complete political community. In other words, the self-
government of any political community or people must be viewed within
the framework of global law to be globally legitimated. The practical
consequence of this insight is that global law should not depend on the
consent of the state, as it has happened with classical international law.
Global law should have the same legitimacy in the global community that 
the national law has in the national community. In this sense, a postpositivist
approach is required, since any political community influences the global 
community, and the global community influences the national community.118 
From this perspective, no legal system in a globalized world would consist 
only of norms and regulations commanded by a single sovereign. If this is
so, the idea of constituent power should be extended and not rigidly constrained
to national power. However, this does not mean that a global constituent
power should be recognized.
H. A Nonpositivist Approach to the Law
Roman law offers a prepositivist approach to the law and prevents global
constitutionalism from taking an implicit or explicit positivist position. 
The term positive law (ius positivum) is not a Roman creation but a medieval
112. Rafael Domingo, A New Global Law for a New Global Human Community, FREE 






 118. See infra section II.H.
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one.119 The distinction between positive law and natural law was first
proposed by French scholars such as William of Conches, Hugh of Saint
Victor, and Peter Abelard, as well as French canonists of the twelfth century.120 
This does not mean that Roman law does not consist of positive law: the 
Roman civil law, the praetorian law, and the Roman law of nations certainly
can be categorized by the non-Roman term “positive law.” In the words 
of one of the great positivists, Hans Kelsen, “positivism confines itself to
a theory of positive law and its interpretation.”121 Positivism thus stands
completely outside Roman law, which offers instead an integrated framework
to the different dimensions of the law: law of nations, fetial law, sacred
law, praetorian law, and civil law, among others.
Global constitutionalism should recognize the relevance of positive law, 
but positive law must fulfill its function as part of a cosmopolitan and
postpositivist framework.122 Global constitutionalism cannot be positivist, 
because it could not be firmly connected to the most relevant postulates
of positivism. Unlike positivism, global constitutionalism demands that 
the sovereign lawmaking authority be subjected to legitimate limitation.
Unlike positivism, global constitutionalism advocates for internal constraints
of constituent powers that cannot be provided merely by appealing to the 
will of people, and it demands that global normative standards cannot be 
created out of nothing, based only on a sovereign act of popular will. 
Unlike positivism, global constitutionalism should not confuse global law 
and global legality, and it should not demand a basic norm as a reason for 
validity. Yet, some principles, values, institutions, and standards should be 
used as parameters to inspire the new global public law.
Global constitutionalism should transcend positivism rather than rejecting 
all positivist ideas and assumptions. As postpositivists accept that the theories,
knowledge, and values of a researcher can influence what is observed,123 
so global constitutionalism states that any behavior of a political community
affects the global community, and any behavior of the global community
affects the particular community. The global community and the national 
119. THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT 306–38 (J. H. Burns 
ed., 1988) (2010). 
120. See  STEN GAGNÉR, STUDIEN ZUR IDEENGESCHICHTE DER GESETZGEBUNG 210– 
40 (1960); THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 119, 
at 336. 
121. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 391 (Andres Wedberg trans., 
1961) (2007).
122. See Kumm, Constituent Power, Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, and Post-Positivist
Law, supra note 100, at 698. 
123. There is a connection between post-positivism and quantum physics. Quantum
236
theory  states that by the very act of watching, the observer affects the observed reality; see, e.g., 
KENNETH W. FORD, THE QUANTUM WORLD: QUANTUM PHYSICS FOR EVERYONE (2004)
(providing an overview of quantum theory). 
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community are both observers and observed constitutional realities. Global 
constitutionalism allows us to see the state not only from within but also
from outside. This explains why interdependence is at the heart of global 
constitutionalism.124 The protection of human rights, for example, is critical 
in both international and national law. If human rights are not well protected
in national courts, then international tribunals are available to review violations.
But if international tribunals violate the international law of human rights, 
national courts need not abide by these international tribunal decisions. In 
these cases, as Geir Ulfstein has argued, the constitutional value of protecting 
human rights should prevail over the importance of respecting judicial 
decisions by international tribunals.125 
I. Centrality of Litigation and Plurality of Jurisdictions  
The history of Roman legal procedures is hardly less than the history of 
the legal system itself. Legal remedies and litigation in general influenced
the structure and evolution of Roman law insofar that substantive law can
be understood only from this procedural perspective.126 Roman jurists 
were more concerned about specific legal remedies than abstract rights.127 
For this reason, Roman law is by nature a law of actions. The link between 
the classical period and legal procedure is so strong that the classical period 
ended along with the fading of the so-called formulary procedure around
230 CE.128 
The praetor was the jurisdictional magistrate par excellence. The key to 
praetorian law lays in the fact that the praetor controlled remedies, and his
primary legal function was to grant remedies in individual cases.129 If both 
parties were Roman citizens, the magistrate with jurisdiction inside the 
limits of Rome was the urban praetor.130 If one or both litigants were not
124. See Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential 
of Fundamental International Norms and Structures, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 579, 579–610
(2006), for a discussion of compensatory constitutionalism. 
125. See KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 1, at 152; ANDREAS FØLLESDAL ET AL.,
THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 1–3 (2014).
126. DOMINGO, ROMAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 5, at 111. 
127. Id.
 128. Id. at 5. 
129.  Id. at 51, 138. 
130. Id. at 114. 
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Roman citizens, the jurisdictional magistrate was the praetor peregrinus.131 
The growth of international trade led the Romans to recognize some
institutions and transactions (e.g., contract of sales, service, and loans)
that could be applied by Roman courts to relations between foreigners and
between foreigners and citizens (ius gentium).132 The aediles curules had
jurisdictional power over sales concluded in the market of Rome.133 A special 
court had jurisdiction where some relevant inheritances were claimed or 
the validity of a will was challenged.134 Some cases of greater public interest
came under the jurisdiction of a court of several judges called recuperatores.135 
In the provinces, the governor had jurisdiction and played the role of the 
praetor.136 Local magistrates were to display and administer justice according
to the edict of the provincial governor.137 In Italian municipia, local 
magistrates had a limited jurisdiction, and it was possible for parties to
demand transfer of the procedure to Rome.138 By voluntary and formal
agreement (compromissum), Roman law also allowed parties to submit a 
dispute to arbitration.139 The enforcement of the award came from the
reciprocal stipulations given by the litigants and was strengthened by 
penalties as an additional part of the agreement.140 The advantage of
arbitration was that the arbitrator had more freedom to determine an award 
than did the judge of the formulary procedure, who was always bound by
the praetor’s instructions inserted in the formula.141 This basic outline of
legal procedure shows the great flexibility of the Roman legal order due 
to the plurality of interrelated jurisdictions under the same legal system. 
A relevant feature of current international law, and a clear expression 
of its constitutionalization, is the increased importance and establishment
of international tribunals and the judicialization of dispute settlement.142 
In the last decades, new courts and tribunals, such as the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea, the World Trade Organization dispute-settlement
body, and arbitration by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), among others, have been created. As a result, relevant 
areas of law, such as international trade law and the law of the sea, are
131. Id.
132.  Gordon E. Sherman, Jus Gentium and International Law, 12 AM. J. OF INT’L L.
56, 59–60 (1918). 
133. DOMINGO, ROMAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 5, at 114. 





 139. Id. at 124. 
140. Id.
 141. Id.
 142. See KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 1 at 126–52. 
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brought under international judicial control. These tribunals mix in and
interfere in national state actions while developing constitutional functions 
beyond the state. Global constitutionalism should continue expanding a 
system of jurisdictional pluralism that hinders, restrains, and prevents the
excessive concentration of judicial authority, without being afraid of 
reasonable fragmentation. Roman law offers to global constitutionalism a 
good example of legal and jurisdictional pluralism. Territorial borders 
cannot solve all legal conflicts. 
J. A Practical Law Connected With Reality  
Roman jurists cultivated a sophisticated and practical legal science and 
produced a substantial literature in the field of law.143 These included 
commentaries on civil law and on the praetorian edict, collections of legal 
opinions or legal distinctions, monographs on legal topics, and so on.144 But 
unlike the Greeks, Roman jurists spent little time on philosophical abstractions.145 
They were primarily concerned with finding fair solutions in individual 
cases.146 Their interest in philosophical issues was peripheral. They did
not develop a general theory of justice, law, the state, or political administration. 
They simply accommodated Greek philosophy when necessary for their 
legal purposes. Roman jurists were concerned with the daily practice of 
law, probably because most of them were public men involved in politics 
and were interested in legal issues (without any remuneration) only as a 
part of their political careers. The development of legal science was a matter
of disputation over interpretations of law, and legal science was very much 
linked with authentic legal conflicts. 
Global constitutionalism is mainly defended and developed by scholars 
and, to some extent, by international courts, but not by national governments, 
treaty-makers, and powerful international actors.147 Thus, constitutionalism
runs the risk of isolating itself, creating its own unconnected discourse
detached from legal reality, or as Anne Peters has pointed out, the risk of 
promoting a government of judges “in which judicial self-empowerment 
143. DOMINGO, ROMAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 5, at 62. 
144. Id. 
145. See, e.g., FRITZ SCHULTZ, HISTORY OF ROMAN LEGAL SCIENCE 60–64 (1946);
see also DOMINGO, ROMAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 5, at 62. 
146. DOMINGO, ROMAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 5, at 62. 
147. See Peters, Are We Moving Towards Constitutionalization of the World Community?, 
supra note 83, at 118–28. 
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is achieved with the help of constitutional language.”148 This peril is real.
Roman law offers global constitutionalism a good example of developing 
a practical legal science elaborated from legal conflicts rather than from 
legal abstractions. Global constitutionalism should not be limited to an 
intellectual, infertile product. It should be, on the contrary, a way of thinking 
that illuminates the whole body of international law in the era of globalization. 
III. CONCLUSION
Roman law offers good lessons in how legal systems, doctrines, and
paradigms can be developed and modernized based on equitable ideas and
principles. It is therefore a profitable source of inspiration for emerging 
global constitutionalism. The cosmopolitan spirit of Roman law, its
unwritten constitution, its respect for tradition, and its legal pluralism are 
among the features of the Roman law system that can help to develop a 
coherent constitutionalization of international law. But the most important 
link between Roman law and global constitutionalism is that, while Roman
law offered a prestatist, presovereigntist, prenationalist, and prepositivist 
framework, global constitutionalism offers a postsovereigntist, postnationalist, 
and postpositivist framework. Roman law constitutes an excellent antidote to
the excess of statist, positivist, and sovereign elements in the elaboration 
and development of global constitutionalism.
148. Id. at 128. 
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